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Abstract—An adversary is essentially an algorithm intent on
making a classification system perform in some particular way
given an input, e.g., increase the probability of a false negative.
Recent work builds adversaries for deep learning systems applied
to image object recognition, which exploits the parameters of
the system to find the minimal perturbation of the input image
such that the network misclassifies it with high confidence. We
adapt this approach to construct and deploy an adversary of
deep learning systems applied to music content analysis. In our
case, however, the input to the systems is magnitude spectral
frames, which requires special care in order to produce valid
input audio signals from network-derived perturbations. For two
different train-test partitionings of two benchmark datasets, and
two different deep architectures, we find that this adversary is
very effective in defeating the resulting systems. We find the
convolutional networks are more robust, however, compared with
systems based on a majority vote over individually classified
audio frames. Furthermore, we integrate the adversary into the
training of new deep systems, but do not find that this improves
their resilience against the same adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning is impacting the research domain of mu-
sic content analysis and music information retrieval (MIR)
[19], [28], [31], [34], [41], [44], [57], [63], [65], but recent
developments raise the spectre that the high performance of
these systems does not reflect how well they have learned to
solve high-level problems of music listening. MIR aims to
produce systems that help make “music, or information about
music, easier to find” [14]. This is of principal importance
for confronting the vast amount of music data that exists and
continues to be created. Listening machines that can flexibly
produce accurate, meaningful and searchable descriptions of
music can greatly reduce the cost of processing music data,
and can facilitate a diversity of applications. These extend
from music identification [59], author attribution [13], recom-
mendation [57], transcription [21], and playlist generation [2],
to extracting semantic descriptors such as genre and mood
[9], [49], [64], to computational musicology [15], and even
synthesis and music composition [43].
Recent surveys of the domain of deep learning record
impressive results for several benchmark problems [6], [17]. In
addition to these major successes, deep learning methods are
very attractive for three other reasons: there now exist efficient
and effective training algorithms for deep learning, not to men-
tion completely free and open cross-platform implementations,
e.g., Theano [4], [8]; they entail jointly optimising feature
learning and classification, thus allowing one to forgo many
difficulties inherent to formally encoding expert knowledge
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into a machine; and their layered structures seems to favour
hierarchical representations of structures in data. One caveat,
however, is that these methods require a lot of data in order
to estimate parameters and generalise well [37].
In MIR, the works in [28], [34], [35] are among the first
to apply deep learning to music content analysis, and each
describes results pointing to the conclusion that these systems
can automatically learn features relevant for complex music
listening tasks, e.g., recognition of genre or style. Results
since then point to the same conclusion [19], [41], [44], [63],
[65]. Humphrey et al. [31] highlight this fact to argue deep
learning is naturally suited to learn relevant abstractions for
music content analysis, provided enough data is available.
Since music can be seen as a “whole greater than the sum
of its parts” [31], deep learning can help MIR narrow the
“semantic gap” [62], and move beyond what has been called
a “glass ceiling” in performance [3].
However, it is now known how deceiving the appearance
of high performance can be: an MIR system can appear to
be very successful in solving a high-level music listening
problem when in fact it is just exploiting some independent
variables of questionable relevance unknowingly confounded
with the ground truth of a music dataset by a poor experimental
design [22], [23], [39], [47]–[49], [49], [51]–[53], [56]. In
addition, recent work in machine learning has demonstrated
deep learning systems behaving in ways that contradict their
appearance of solving content-recognition problems. Nguyen
et al. [38] show how a high-performing image object recog-
nition system can label with high confidence non-sensical
synthetic images. In a similar direction, we have shown [51]
how a deep system that appears highly capable of recognising
different musical rhythms confidently classifies synthesised
rhythms, though they bear little similarity to the rhythms
they supposedly represent. Szegedy et al. [54] show how
deep high-performing image object recognition systems are
highly sensitive to imperceptible perturbations created by an
adversary: an agent that actively seeks to fool a classifier by
perturbing the input such that it results in an incorrect output
but with high confidence [16].
All of these results motivate several timely questions of
deep learning systems for music content analysis specifically,
and multimedia in general. First, how do the adversaries of
Szegedy et al. [54] translate to the context of deep learning
applied to music content analysis? The input of the systems
studied by Szegedy et al. [54] is raw pixel data; however, in
music content analysis only the system studied in [19] takes
as input raw audio samples. The inputs to other deep learning
systems have been features: windowed magnitude spectra
[28], [44], sonograms [34], [57], autocorrelations of spectral
energies [41], [51], or statistics of features [63], [65]. Second,
can we generate an adversary for such deep learning music
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2content analysis systems that produce adversarial examples
that are perceptually identical to the originals? Third, can we
“harness” an adversary to train deep learning systems that are
robust to its “malfeasance”? Finally, and more broadly, what
is deep learning contributing to music content analysis? Can
we use adversaries to reveal whether these deep systems are
using better models of the content than other state of the art
systems using hand-crafted features?
Our preliminary work [33] shows that it is possible to create
highly effective adversaries of the music content analysis
deep neural networks (DNN) studied in [28], [44]. These
adversaries can make the systems always wrong, always right,
and anywhere in-between, with high confidence by applying
only minor perturbations of the input magnitude spectra.
Furthermore, we created an ensemble of adversaries that can
coax the DNN into assigning with high confidence any label to
the same music by perturbing the input by very small amounts
(e.g., 26.8 dB SNR). In this article, we greatly expand upon
our prior work [33] to include convolutional deep learning
systems, more extensive testing in a larger benchmark MIR
dataset, and the results of incorporating an adversary into the
training of these different deep learning systems.
In the next section, we provide an overview of work
applying deep learning to music content analysis and MIR. We
then review two different deep learning architectures, and our
construction of several music content analysis systems using
two partitions of two MIR benchmark datasets. In Sec. III
we review adversaries, and design an adversary for our deep
systems. We then present in Sec. IV a series of experiments
using our adversary. In Section V we provide a discussion
of our work in wider contexts. We conclude in section VI.
Some of our results can be produced with the software here:
https://github.com/coreyker/dnn-mgr.
II. DEEP LEARNING FOR MUSIC CONTENT ANALYSIS
We first provide an overview of research in applying deep
learning approaches to music content analysis. We then discuss
two different architectures, train two music content analysis
systems, and test them in two benchmark MIR datasets. These
systems are the subjects of our experiments in Section IV.
A. Overview
Artificial neural networks have been applied to many music
content analysis problems, [26], for instance, fingerprinting
[12], genre recognition [36], emotion recognition [58], artist
recognition [61], and even composition [40]. Advances in
training have enabled the creation of more advanced and
deeper architectures. Deng and Yu [17] (Chapter 7) provide
a review of successful applications of deep learning to the
analysis of audio, highlighting in particular its significant
contributions to speech recognition in conversational settings.
Humphrey et al. [31] provide a review for applications to
music in particular, and motivate the capacity of deep ar-
chitectures to automatically learn hierarchical relationships in
accordance with the hierarchical nature of music: “pitch and
loudness combine over time to form chords, melodies and
rhythms.” They argue that this is key for moving beyond the
reliance on “shallow” and hand-designed features that were
designed for different tasks.
Lee et al. [34] are perhaps the first to apply deep learn-
ing to music content analysis, specifically genre and artist
recognition. They train a convolutional deep belief network
(CDBN) with two hidden layers in an unsupervised manner
in an attempt to make the hidden layer activations produce
meaningful features from a pre-processed spectrogram in-
put computed using 20 ms 50%-overlapped windows. The
spectrogram is “PCA-whitened”, which involves projecting
it onto a lower-dimensional space using scaled eigenvectors.
Important details are missing in the description of the work,
but it appears they use the activations as features in some
train/test task using a standard machine learning approach.
A table of their experimental results, using some portion
of the dataset ISMIR2004, shows higher accuracies for their
deep learned features compared to those for standard MFCCs.
For genre recognition, Li et al. [35] use convolutional deep
neural networks (CDNN) with three hidden layers, into which
they input a sequence of 190 13-dimensional MFCC feature
vectors. The architecture of their CDNN is such that the first
hidden layer considers data from 127 ms duration, and the
last hidden layer is capable of summarising events over a 2.2
s duration. van den Oord et al. [57] apply CDNN to mel-
frequency spectrograms for automatic music content analysis.
For genre recognition and more general descriptors, Hamel
and Eck [28] train a DNN with three hidden layers of 50
units each, taking as input 513 discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) magnitudes computed from a single 46 ms audio
frame. They use a train/valid/test partition of the benchmark
music genre dataset GTZAN [49], [55]. They also explore
“aggregated” features, which are the mean and variance in
each dimension of activations over 5 second durations. They
find in the test set, and for both short-term and aggregated
features, that SVM classifiers trained with features built from
hidden layer activations reproduce more ground truth than an
SVM classifier trained with features built from MFCCs. They
report an accuracy of over 0.84 for features that aggregate
activations of all three hidden layers. Sigtia and Dixon [44]
explore modifications to the system in [28], in particular using
different combinations of architectures, training procedures,
and regularisation. They use the activations of their trained
DNN as features for a train/test task using a random for-
est classifier. They report an accuracy of about 0.83 using
features aggregating activations of all hidden layers of 500
units each. For genre recognition, Yang et al. [63] combine
263-dimensional modulation features with a DBN. For music
rhythm classification, Pikrakis [41] employs a DBN, which we
studied further in [51]–[53].
Dieleman et al. [18] build and apply CDBN to music
key detection, artist recognition, and genre recognition. There
are three major differences with respect to the work above
[28], [34], [35], [44], [63]. First, Dieleman et al. employ 24-
dimensional input features computed by averaging short-time
chroma and timbre features over the time scales of single
musical beats. Second, they employ expert musical knowl-
edge to guide decisions about the architecture of the system.
Finally, they use the output posteriors of their system for
3Input
     1st conv. layer
(4/32 filters shown)
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Softmax
Fig. 1. Illustration of the CDNN architecture we use for our experiments. The CDNN first applies narrow vertical filters to the input sonogram (left) to
capture harmonic structure. Then, it applies 32 different filters in the first convolutional layer (we show only 4). This is followed by the first max-pooling
layer, and then a 2nd pair of convolutional and max-pooling layers. Finally, the output of the final max-pooling layer is fully connected to a final hidden layer
of 50 units, followed by a softmax output unit. The input spectrogram contains 100 time slices, which means that the final layer of the CDNN summarises
information over a total duration of 2.35 seconds.
classification, instead of using the hidden layer activations as
features for a separate classifier. Their experiments in a portion
of the “million song dataset” [10] show large differences in
classification accuracies between their systems and a naive
Bayesian classifier using the same input features. In a unique
direction for audio, Dieleman and Schrauwen [19] explore
“end-to-end” learning, where a CDNN is trained with input of
about 3 s of raw audio samples for a music content analysis
task (autotagging). They find that the lowest layer of the
trained CDNN appears to learn some filters that are frequency
selective. They evaluate this system for a multilabel problem.
To recognise music mood, Weninger et al. [60] use recurrent
DNN with input constructed of several statistics of low-
level features computed over second-long excerpts of music
recordings. Battenberg and Wessel [5] apply DBN for iden-
tifying the beat numbers over several measures of percussive
music, with input features consisting of quantised onset times
and magnitudes. Boulanger-Lewandowski et al. [11] train a
recurrent neural network to produce chord classifications using
input of PCA-whitened magnitude DFT. In a similar direction,
Humphrey and Bello [32] build a DNN that maps input
spectrogram features to guitar-specific fingerings of chords.
B. Two types of deep architectures
We now review two different architectures of deep learning
systems, and the way they are trained. A DNN is an artificial
neural network with several hidden layers [17]. The output
of each layer is a non-linear function of its inputs, obtained
by a matrix multiplication cascaded with a non-linearity,
e.g., tanh, sigmoid and rectifier. By chaining together several
hidden layers, composite representations of the input emerge
in deeper layers. This fact can give deep networks greater
representational power than shallower networks containing an
equivalent number of parameters [7].
A CDNN is a special type of DNN with weights that are
shared between multiple points between adjacent layers. The
weight sharing in CDNNs not only reduces the number of
trainable parameters, but also causes matrix multiplications to
reduce to convolutions, which can be implemented efficiently.
Furthermore, many natural signals have local spatial or tempo-
ral structures that are repeated globally. For example, natural
images often consist of oriented edges; and audio signals often
consist of harmonic and repetitive structures. CDNNs can learn
these types of structures very well. Figure 1 illustrates our
CDNN, which we discuss in the following subsection.
The contemporary success of deep learning comes with
computationally efficient training methods. Systems that have
such deep architectures are usually trained using gradient
descent, which consists of backpropagating error derivatives
from the cost function through the network. There are a
plethora of useful tips and tricks to augment training, including
stochastic gradient descent, dropout regularisation, weight
decay, momentum, learning rate decay, and so on [37].
C. Deep learning with two music genre benchmarks
We now build DNNs and CDNNs using two music genre
benchmarks: GTZAN [49], [55] and the Latin Music Database
(LMD) [45]. GTZAN consists of 100 30-second music record-
ing excerpts in each of ten categories, and is the most-used
public dataset in MIR research [50]. LMD is a private dataset,
consisting of 3,229 full-length music track recordings non-
uniformly distributed among ten categories, and has been used
in the annual MIREX audio latin music genre classification
evaluation campaign since 2008.1 We use the first 30 seconds
of each track in LMD.
We build several DNNs and CDNNs using different par-
titionings of these datasets. One partitioning of GTZAN
1http://www.music-ir.org/mirex/wiki/MIREX HOME
4we create by randomly selecting 500/250/250 excerpts for
training/validation/testing. The other partitioning of GTZAN
is “fault-filtered,” which we construct by hand to include
443/197/290 excerpts. This involves removing 70 files includ-
ing exact replicas, recording replicas, and distorted files [49],
and then dividing the excerpts such that no artist is repeated
across the training, validation, and test partitions. We partition
LMD in two ways: 1) partitioning by 60/20/20% sampling
in each class; 2) a hand-constructed artist-filtered partitioning
containing approximately the same division of excerpts in each
class. We retain all 213 replicas in LMD.2
The input to our systems is derived from the short-time
Fourier transform (STFT) of a sampled audio signal x [1]:
F(x)[m,u] =
L−1∑
l=0
w[l]x[l − uH]e−j2piml/L (1)
where the parameter L defines both the window length and the
number of frequency bins. We define w as a Hann window of
length L = 1024, which corresponds to a duration of 46ms
for recordings sampled at 22050 Hz. The window is hopped
along x with a stride of H = 512 samples (adjacent windows
overlap by 50%).
Since audio signals can be of any duration, we define the
input to our systems as a sequence X = (Xn)N−1n=0 , where the
sequence length depends on the input audio’s duration. We
define the nth element of the input sequence X to be
Xn ,
(∣∣∣F(x)[m,u]∣∣∣ : m ∈ [0, 512], u ∈ [nT, (n+1)T [) (2)
where T = 1 for each DNN and T = 100 for each CDNN.
Thus, when T = 1, X is a sequence of 513×1 vectors; when
T = 100, X is a sequence of 513× 100 matrices.
A (C)DNN processes each element in this sequence inde-
pendently, outputting a sequence P = (Pn)N−1n=0 from the final
(softmax) layer. The output vector Pn ∈ [0, 1]K , ‖Pn‖1 = 1,
is the posterior distribution of labels assigned to the nth
element in the input sequence by the network. Therefore, we
may write Pn(i|Xn,Θ) ≡ Pn(i) ∈ [0, 1] where Θ represents
the trainable network parameters, i.e., the set of weights and
biases. We define the confidence of a (C)DNN in a particular
label k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} for an input sequence X as the sum of
all posteriors, i.e.,
R(k|X,Θ) = 1
N
N−1∑
n=0
Pn(k|Xn,Θ). (3)
We apply a label to an input sequence X as the one maximis-
ing the confidence
y(X,Θ) = arg max
k∈{1,...,K}
R(k|X,Θ). (4)
Paralleling the work in [44], we build DNNs with 3 fully
connected hidden layers, and either 50 or 500 units per layer.
Our CDNN has two convolutional layers (accompanied by
max pooling layers) followed by a fully connected hidden
layer with 50 units. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of our
CDNN. Its first convolutional layer contains 32 filters, each
2https://highnoongmt.wordpress.com/2014/02/08/faults in the latin music database
arranged in a rectangular 400 × 4 grid. We choose this long
rectangular shape instead of the small square patches typically
used when training on images based on our knowledge that
many sounds exhibit strong harmonic structures that span a
large portion of the audible spectrum. The second convolu-
tional layer contains 32 filters, each connected in an 8 × 8
pattern. Our two pooling neighborhoods are 4 × 4 and have
strides of 2×2. All of our deep learning systems use rectified
linear units (ReLUs), and have a softmax unit in the final layer.
As is typical, we standardise the (C)DNN inputs by subtracting
the training set mean and dividing by the standard deviation
in each of the input dimensions. We perform this with a linear
layer above the input layer of each network. The raw inputs
to the network are still Xn.
Also paralleling [44], we build several music classification
systems treating our DNN as a feature extractor. In this case,
we construct a set of features by concatenating the activations
from the DNN’s three hidden layers, and aggregating them
over 5-second texture windows (hopped by 50%). The ag-
gregation summarises the mean and standard deviation of the
feature dimensions over the texture window and may be seen
as a form of late-integration of temporal information. We use
this new set of features to train a random forest (RF) classifier
[29] with 500 trees. Thus, to classify a music audio recording
x from its set of aggregated features, we use majority voting
over all classifications, which is also used in [44].
D. Preliminary evaluation
Figure 2 and Table I show the results of RF classification
using the features produced by the DNN when trained on
GTZAN with the two different partitioning strategies; and Fig.
3 shows those for the (C)DNNs we train and test in LMD.
Across each partition strategy we see significant differences
in performance. The mean recall in each class in Figure 2
on the fault-filtered partition is much lower than that on
the random test partition — involving drops higher than 30
percentage points in most cases. Table I shows similar drops
in performance that persist over the inclusion of drop-out
regularisation. Such significant drops in performance from
partitioning based on artists is not unusual, and has been
studied before as a bias coming from the experimental design
[23], [39], [49]. Partitioning a music genre recognition dataset
along artist lines has been recommended to avoid this bias
[23], [39], and is in fact used in several MIREX audio
classification tasks.3 Experiments using GTZAN with fault-
filtering partitioning has not been used in many benchmark
experiments with GTZAN because its artist information has
only recently been made available [49].
III. ADVERSARIES IN MUSIC CONTENT ANALYSIS
An adversary is an agent that tries to defeat a classification
system in order to maximise its gain, e.g., SPAM detection.
Dalvi et al. [16] pose this problem as a game between a
classifier and adversary, and analyse the strategies involved
for an adversary with complete knowledge of the classification
3http://www.music-ir.org/mirex/wiki/MIREX HOME
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0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 90.5
0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 88.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 92.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 79.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 92.0 0.0 16.0 74.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 64.0 8.0 84.2
0.0 0.0 4.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 4.0 48.0 63.2
88.5 91.3 92.0 70.2 82.6 90.2 85.2 82.1 72.7 54.5 81.2
(a) Random partitioning
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0.0 0.0 6.7 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
12.9 0.0 56.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 3.8 12.5 60.7
9.7 0.0 23.3 24.1 3.7 37.0 3.7 3.3 7.7 40.6 15.6
19.4 0.0 0.0 17.2 70.4 0.0 3.7 6.7 30.8 12.5 42.2
16.1 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 29.6 0.0 3.3 7.7 0.0 47.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 85.2 0.0 0.0 6.2 88.5
0.0 0.0 6.7 3.4 22.2 25.9 0.0 83.3 7.7 6.2 55.6
38.7 0.0 6.7 20.7 3.7 7.4 3.7 3.3 42.3 15.6 26.8
3.2 0.0 0.0 13.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 16.7
0.0 100.0 58.6 18.9 52.8 36.4 86.8 66.7 32.8 5.3 49.0
(b) Artist-filtered partitioning
Fig. 2. Figure of merit (FoM, ×100) in GTZAN with two different partitionings for random forest classification (majority vote) of DNN-based features (all
layers) aggregated over 5 second windows (mean and standard deviations). Each DNN has 500 rectified linear units in each hidden layer. Columns represent
the true class; rows denote labels chosen by system; the diagonal contains the per-class recall; the off-diagonal entries are confusions; the rightmost column
is the precision; the bottom row is the F-score; and the last element along the diagonal is the mean recall (normalised classification accuracy).
Hidden Units Layer ReLU ReLU+Dropout
50
1 76.00 (40.69) 80.40 (45.17)
2 78.80 (45.17) 80.40 (43.10)
3 79.60 (43.79) 78.80 (44.48)
All 80.40 (43.79) 80.00 (43.79)
500
1 68.40 (40.34) 75.60 (40.69)
2 74.40 (40.69) 80.00 (50.34)
3 77.60 (43.79) 79.20 (48.62)
All 76.00 (42.41) 81.20 (48.97)
TABLE I
MEAN NORMALISED CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY (×100) IN GTZAN FOR
RANDOM FOREST CLASSIFICATION OF DNN-BASED FEATURES FROM
LAYER SHOWN AGGREGATED OVER 5-SECOND WINDOWS. NUMBER
OUTSIDE BRACKETS IS FROM RANDOM PARTITION IN FIG. 2(A); AND THAT
INSIDE BRACKETS IS FROM FAULT-FILTERED PARTITION IN FIG. 2(B).
system, and for a classifier to adapt to such an adversary.
Szegedy et al. [54] propose using adversaries for testing the
assumption that deep learning systems are “smooth classifiers,”
i.e., stable in their classification to small perturbations around
examples in the training data. They define an adversary of
a classifier f : Rm → {1, . . . ,K} as an algorithm using
complete knowledge of the classifier to perturb an observation
x ∈ Rm such that f(x + r) 6= f(x), where r ∈ Rm is some
small perturbation. Specifically, their adversary solves the
constrained optimisation problem for a given k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}:
min ‖r‖2 subject to f(x+ r) = k. (5)
For k 6= f(x), Szegedy et al. [54] employ a line search
along the direction of the loss function of the network starting
from x until the classifier produces the requested class. They
find that adversarial examples of one classifier can fool other
classifiers trained on independent data; hence, one need not
have complete knowledge of a classifier in order to fool it.
Goodfellow et al. [24] provide an intuitive explanation
of these adversaries: even though the perturbations in each
dimension might be small, their contribution to the magnitude
of a projection grows linearly with input dimensionality. With
a deep neural network involving many such projections in each
layer, a small perturbation at its high-dimensional input layer
can create major consequences at the output layer. Goodfellow
et al. [24] show that adversarial examples can be easily
generated by making the perturbation proportional to the sign
of the partial derivative of the loss function used to train a
particular network, evaluated with the requested class. They
also find that the direction of perturbation is important, not
necessarily its size. Hence, it seems adversarial examples of
one model will likely fool other models because they occur in
large volumes in high-dimensional spaces. This is also found
by Gu and Rigazio [27].
As for Szegedy et al. [54], we are interested the robustness
of our deep learning music content analysis systems to an
adversary. Do these systems suffer just as dramatically as
the image content recognition systems in [24], [27], [54]? In
other words, can we find imperceptible perturbations of audio
recordings, yet make the systems produce any label with high
confidence? If so, can we adapt the training of the systems
such that they become more robust? In the next subsections,
we define an adversary as an optimisation problem, but with
care of the fact that the input to our deep learning systems are
magnitude STFT (2). We then present an approach to integrate
adversaries into the training of our systems. We present our
experimental results in Section IV.
A. Adversaries for music audio
The explicit goal of our adversary is to perturb a music
recording x such that a system will confidently classify it
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76.0 95.9 65.5 81.0 79.6 94.7 75.6 87.0 69.2 92.5 81.2
(a) DNN Random partitioning
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89.4 9.7 7.9 28.1 3.2 12.9 27.9 6.5 29.0 1.2 42.8
0.0 64.5 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.6
1.5 9.7 71.4 8.8 0.0 1.6 1.6 9.7 13.0 19.8 50.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
0.0 1.6 0.0 14.0 85.7 1.6 0.0 1.6 15.9 2.5 69.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.6 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 94.3
7.6 9.7 12.7 19.3 11.1 3.2 67.2 16.1 15.9 0.0 40.6
0.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.3 0.0 2.5 90.5
1.5 0.0 0.0 19.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 23.2 2.5 51.6
0.0 3.2 4.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 71.6 86.6
57.8 77.7 58.8 16.1 76.6 87.0 50.6 73.1 32.0 78.4 62.8
(b) DNN Artist-filtered partitioning
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92.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 12.0 2.0 8.0 0.0 74.2
0.0 100.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 90.9
2.0 0.0 76.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 8.0 20.0 8.0 62.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 86.0 6.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 87.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.4
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 88.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 93.6
0.0 0.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 78.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 90.7
2.0 0.0 10.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 78.4
4.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 12.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 64.0 0.0 66.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 92.0 95.8
82.1 95.2 68.5 86.9 79.1 90.7 83.9 79.2 65.3 93.9 82.4
(c) CDNN Random partitioning
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36.4 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.2 1.6 0.0 1.6 1.4 0.0 77.4
1.5 85.5 1.6 0.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 86.9
16.7 6.5 77.8 10.5 4.8 1.6 13.1 0.0 27.5 45.7 35.5
0.0 1.6 4.8 52.6 6.3 0.0 6.6 0.0 7.2 0.0 63.8
13.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 69.8 1.6 4.9 0.0 15.9 0.0 62.0
0.0 1.6 0.0 1.8 0.0 88.7 4.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 90.2
1.5 1.6 1.6 8.8 6.3 0.0 52.5 3.2 5.8 0.0 64.0
21.2 1.6 3.2 1.8 4.8 4.8 13.1 93.5 4.3 3.7 60.4
9.1 0.0 9.5 19.3 3.2 0.0 4.9 0.0 31.9 0.0 44.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.6 100.0
49.5 86.2 48.8 57.7 65.7 89.4 57.7 73.4 37.0 67.2 63.2
(d) CDNN Artist-filtered partitioning
Fig. 3. FoM for deep learning systems with two different partitioning strategies of LMD. Interpretation as in Fig. 2; but note that in this case we are using
the deep learning systems as the classifiers, instead of performing classification using a random forest with features derived from hidden layer activations.
with some class y ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Specifically, we define the
adversary as the constrained optimisation problem:
Xˆ(y) = arg min
Z∈C(X)
N−1∑
n=0
L(Zn, y|Θ) (6)
where we define the feasible set of adversarial examples to
input sequence X as:
C(X) =
{
Z = (Zn)
N−1
n=0 :√∑N−1
n=0 ‖Zn −Xn‖22 ≤ N(SNR)
}
(7)
with the parameter
(SNR) =
1
N
√∑N−1
n=0 ‖Xn‖22
10SNR/20
(8)
limiting the maximum acceptable perturbation caused by the
adversary. The loss function in (6) is the cross-entropy loss
function, L(Xn, y|Θ) := − logPn(y|Xn,Θ), which we use
in training our (C)DNNs. Given the network parameters Θ,
this adversary can compute the derivative of this loss function
by backpropagating derivatives through the network. This sug-
gests that our adversary can accomplish its goal by searching
for a new input sequence Xˆ via gradient descent on the loss
function with any label y that differs from the ground truth.
This is the approach used by Szegedy et al. [54] in the context
7Algorithm 1 From exemplar sequence X search for adver-
sarial sequence Xˆ with maximal perturbation SNR in at most
kmax steps that makes a (C)DNN with parameters Θ apply
label y with confidence Rmin.
1: parameters: y, SNR, µ,Rmin,Θ, kmax
2: init: X(0) = X, k = 0
3: repeat
4: V ← X(k) + µ∇L(X(k), y|Θ) {Gradient step}
5: W ← PGL(max(0, V )) {Find valid sequence}
6: ν ← max(0, 1N
√∑N−1
n=0 ||Wn −Xn||22/(SNR) − 1)
{Lagrange mult.}
7: X(k+1) ← (1 + ν)−1(W + νX) {SNR constraint}
8: k ← k + 1
9: until 1N
∑N−1
n=0 Pn(y|X(k+1),Θn ) ≥ Rmin or k = kmax
10: return: Xˆ = X(k)
of image object recognition.
A local minimum of (6) can be found using projected
gradient descent, initialised with the exemplar Xˆ(0) ← X ,
and iterating
Xˆ(k+1) ← PC(Xˆ(k) + µ∇L(Xˆ(k), y|Θ)) (9)
where the scalar µ is the gradient descent step size, and
PC(·) computes the least squares projection of its argument
onto the set C(X) defined in (7). Note that we define op-
erations on sequences element-wise, e.g., ∇L(Xˆ(k), y|Θ) =
(∇L(Xˆ(k)n , y|Θ))N−1n=0 .
The main difficulty with this approach is that not all
sequences Xˆ can be mapped back to valid time-domain
signals xˆ. This is because the analysis in (1) uses overlapping
windows, which causes adjacent elements in the sequence X to
become dependent. This means that individual elements from
the sequence X cannot be adjusted arbitrarily if we want X
to have an analog in the time-domain. Therefore, in order to
generate valid adversarial examples, we include an additional
processing step that projects the sequence Xˆ onto the space
of time-frequency coefficients arising from valid time-domain
sequences. This is done using the Griffin and Lim algorithm
[25], which seeks to minimise
PGL(Xˆ) = min
Z∈X
N−1∑
n=0
||Zn − Xˆn||22 (10)
where X = {X = (Xn)N−1n=0 : PGL(X) = X} denotes the set
of all valid sequences. This minimization can be performed
using alternating projections, and we have found that in
practice it is sufficient to apply a single set of projections. We
do this by first rebuilding a complex valued time-frequency
representation from the sequence Xˆ
U [m,u] ={
Xˆbu/Tc[m,u mod T ]ejΦ[m,u] 0 ≤ m < D
Xˆbu/Tc[D −m,u mod T ]ejΦ[m,u] D ≤ m < L.
(11)
where D = L/2 + 1 and Φ[m,u] , ∠F(x) is the phase
from the exemplar’s Fourier transform. The inverse Fourier
Algorithm 2 Train (C)DNN using database of labeled se-
quences (X,Y) and fast adversarial generation [24], with
ε and µ the gradient descent step sizes for adjusting the
adversarial inputs and network weights, respectively.
1: parameters: ε, µ
2: init: (C)DNN parameters Θ to small random weights
3: repeat
4: select Yˆ uniformly {1, . . . ,K}N
5: Xˆ← X+ ε∇L(X, Yˆ|Θ) {Generate adversarial ex.}
6: Θ← Θ + µ∇L(Xˆ,Y|Θ) {Model update}
7: until Stopping condition
transform F−1(U) is a time-domain signal, and so the Fourier
transform of this signal, F ◦ F−1(U), will yield a valid DFT
spectrum that can be used to build a valid input sequence for
our (C)DNN, i.e., by replacing F(x) by F ◦ F−1(U) in (2).
The pseudo-code in Alg. 1 summarises this approach. The
algorithm may be terminated when the mean posterior of the
target adversarial label exceeds the threshold Rmin, or after a
maximum number of epochs kmax (in which case an adversary
cannot be found above the minimum SNR).
B. Training with adversaries for music audio
As per [54] and [24], we can attempt to use our adversary as
a regulariser, and to create systems robust against adversarial
inputs. In particular, we create adversaries for the (C)DNN
discussed above, and use them to generate a (possibly) infinite
supply of new samples during training. The iterative procedure
for generating adversaries in Alg 1 is too slow to be practical
for training, which requires on the order of 50 to 200 training
epochs. Therefore, we apply the single gradient step procedure
suggested in [24]. In our experience, this procedure often gen-
erates inputs that confuse the network, although not typically
with a high confidence. The pseudo-code in Alg. 2 illustrates
our training algorithm, where (X,Y) represent the training
data, i.e., the set of input audio sequences and their labels,
and Yˆ is a set of adversarial labels.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We can design an adversary (Alg. 1) such that it will attempt
to make a system behave in different ways. For instance,
an adversary could attempt to perturb an input within some
limit (SNR) such that the (C)DNN makes a high-confidence
classification (Rmin ≈ 1) that is correct with probability p.
Another adversary could attempt to make the system label any
input using the same label. We can also make an ensemble of
adversaries such that they produce adversarial examples that
a (C)DNN classifies in every possible way.
We define our adversaries (Alg. 1) using: Rmin = 0.9, SNR
= 15dB, µ = 0.1, and kmax = 100, and with the directive to
make the (C)DNN correct with probability p = 0.1. More
concretely, for each test observations, the adversary draws
uniformly one of the dataset labels y, then seeks to find in
no more than kmax = 100 iterations using step size µ = 0.1
a valid perturbation no larger than 15dB SNR, and which the
(C)DNN labels as y with confidence Rmin = 0.9. Figure 4(a)
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12.9 3.2 0.0 10.3 7.4 11.1 7.4 6.7 7.7 9.4 18.2
3.2 16.1 13.3 10.3 22.2 0.0 18.5 6.7 11.5 12.5 15.2
0.0 12.9 10.0 3.4 0.0 22.2 11.1 3.3 11.5 18.8 11.1
6.5 16.1 6.7 10.3 3.7 7.4 18.5 13.3 11.5 12.5 9.7
12.9 16.1 0.0 13.8 7.4 18.5 11.1 23.3 11.5 9.4 5.6
16.1 9.7 23.3 10.3 18.5 11.1 11.1 16.7 7.7 6.2 7.9
16.1 0.0 16.7 13.8 3.7 3.7 14.8 3.3 0.0 9.4 16.7
22.6 16.1 6.7 10.3 11.1 3.7 0.0 10.0 15.4 6.2 10.0
0.0 6.5 6.7 3.4 11.1 14.8 7.4 13.3 19.2 9.4 19.2
9.7 3.2 16.7 13.8 14.8 7.4 0.0 3.3 3.8 6.2 8.7
15.1 15.6 10.5 10.0 6.3 9.2 15.7 10.0 19.2 7.3 11.7
(a) GTZAN fault-filtered: 23.0± 4.5dB
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12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.2 1.6 1.6 2.9 0.0 53.3
0.0 69.4 0.0 0.0 4.8 3.2 3.3 0.0 4.3 0.0 81.1
33.3 12.9 55.6 12.3 17.5 1.6 18.0 6.5 29.0 76.5 19.3
6.1 0.0 1.6 38.6 1.6 0.0 4.9 4.8 5.8 0.0 57.9
15.2 3.2 1.6 7.0 28.6 0.0 4.9 3.2 24.6 1.2 31.0
1.5 1.6 0.0 3.5 0.0 79.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 0.0 87.5
15.2 3.2 14.3 14.0 15.9 1.6 31.1 1.6 4.3 0.0 30.2
9.1 6.5 17.5 8.8 17.5 6.5 27.9 80.6 8.7 7.4 41.7
7.6 0.0 6.3 15.8 12.7 1.6 6.6 0.0 15.9 0.0 26.2
0.0 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 2.9 14.8 60.0
19.8 74.8 28.7 46.3 29.8 83.1 30.6 54.9 19.8 23.8 41.3
(b) LMD artist-filtered: 15.78± 4.65dB
Fig. 4. For the DNN-based classifier in Fig. 2(b) and the CDNN in Fig. 3(d), but with all input intercepted by an adversary intent on making the maximum
posterior correct with probability p = 0.1. For this adversary, Rmin = 0.9, SNR = 15dB, µ = 0.1, and kmax = 100. Sub-captions show the resulting SNR
(mean ± standard deviation) for the adversarial test sets of GTZAN (N = 290) and LMD (N = 646).
Classification in GTZAN
Music excerpt Blues Classical Country Disco Hiphop Jazz Metal Pop Reggae Rock
Little Richard, “Last Year’s Race Horse” 32 (23) 29 (23) 36 (25) 36 (26) 36 (25) 33 (24) 32 (24) 31 (25) 42 (26) 36 (25)
Rossini, “William Tell Overture” 32 (25) 37 (30) 40 (29) 43 (28) 34 (24) 36 (29) 33 (25) 34 (26) 37 (26) 37 (28)
Willie Nelson, “A Horse Called Music” 25 ( ) 25 (20) 30 (27) 30 (20) 26 (19) 30 (25) 27 (23) 21 (20) 30 (23) 29 (23)
Simian Mobile Disco, “10000 Horses Can’t Be Wrong” 31 (30) 36 (31) 38 (32) 45 (34) 41 (33) 40 (32) 33 (31) 47 (34) 42 (33) 38 (33)
Rubber Bandits, “Horse Outside” 27 (27) 27 (27) 36 (29) 42 (31) 38 (29) 34 (28) 32 (28) 37 (29) 36 (29) 35 (29)
Leonard Gaskin, “Riders in the Sky” 32 (23) 30 (25) 32 (23) 35 (25) 31 (22) 35 (29) 34 (23) 26 (23) 35 (25) 35 (24)
Jethro Tull, “Heavy Horses” 29 (26) 28 (26) 40 (29) 42 (29) 38 (28) 36 (28) 34 (28) 34 (28) 37 (28) 36 (29)
Echo and The Bunnymen, “Bring on the Dancing Horses” 29 (25) 28 (26) 38 (28) 43 (28) 35 (26) 34 (26) 33 (26) 33 (26) 36 (27) 38 (28)
Count Prince Miller, “Mule Train” 32 (30) 29 (30) 41 (33) 37 (34) 43 (33) 36 (31) 33 (31) 42 (34) 40 (33) 33 (33)
Rolling Stones, “Wild Horses” 30 (22) 32 (24) 37 (25) 40 (25) 31 (22) 34 (25) 31 (26) 32 (23) 37 (25) 37 (26)
TABLE II
SNR OF PERTURBATIONS PRODUCED BY TWO ENSEMBLES OF ADVERSARIES THAT INTERCEPT THE INPUT TO THE SYSTEM IN FIG. 2(B) AND HAVE IT
PRODUCE ALL CLASSIFICATIONS POSSIBLE WITH CONFIDENCE THRESHOLDS Rmin = 0.5 (Rmin = 0.9 IN BRACKETS). THE AVERAGE SNR IS 34.5
(26.8) DB. THIS TABLE CAN BE HEARD AT HTTP://WWW.EECS.QMUL.AC.UK/∼STURM/RESEARCH/DNN ADVERSARIES.
shows the FoM of the DNN-based classification system in Fig.
2(b), but with input intercepted by this adversary. Note that in
this case the classification is performed by the same random
forest classifier using the aggregated hidden layer activations,
but the adversary is unaware of this. In other words, it is only
trying to force the DNN to misclassify inputs that have been
subject to minor perturbations. Compared with a normalised
accuracy of 0.49 in Fig. 2(b), we see our adversary has
successfully confused the random forest classifier to be no
better than random. Figure 5 shows one of the adversarial
examples from this experiment. Apart from some significant
high-frequency deviations, the spectrum of the adversary is
very similar to that of the original. The SNR in this example
is 21.1dB.
Figure 4(b) shows the FoM of the CDNN classification
system in Fig. 3(d) attacked by the same adversary. In this
case, the CDNN proved more difficult to fool, but still the
adversary is able to significantly reduce the normalised clas-
sification accuracy from 0.63 to 0.41 with high confidence
classifications at rather high SNR. If we reduce the minimum
confidence Rmin = 0.5 and lessen the SNR constraint to
−300 dB, then the adversary makes the CDNN perform even
worse: a normalised accuracy of 0.28 with a mean SNR of
11.15± 8.32 dB.
For the same system in Fig. 2(b), and using Rmin = 0.9,
SNR = 15dB, µ = 0.1 and kmax = 100, we show in [33] that
we able to create adversaries that make the system always
right, always wrong, and always select “Jazz.” Table II shows
the results of two ensembles of adversaries, each intent on
making the system in Fig. 2(b) choose one of every label in
GTZAN for the same music with SNR = 15dB, µ = 0.1 and
kmax = 100. The adversaries of one ensemble insist upon a
classification confidence of at least Rmin = 0.5; and in the
other of at least 0.9. These music recordings are the same 30-
second excerpts used in [48]. We see that in all case by one,
the ensembles are able to elicit high confidence classifications
from the system with minor perturbations of the input. We also
see that larger perturbations are produced on average when the
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Fig. 5. Top left: spectrogram excerpt from GTZAN Classical “21” (Mozart, Symphony No. 39 Finale) that the DNN-based system in Fig. 2(b) classifies
as Classical. Top middle: spectrogram of adversarial example classified as Reggae. Top right: spectrogram of the difference of the two. Bottom: magnitude
spectrum of one frame (1024 samples) of the original (light blue), adversarial example (black), and difference (orange). Note that all excerpts in GTZAN have
a sampling rate of 22050 Hz. The SNR = 21.1dB.
Norm. Norm. Acc. SNR (dB)
Deep Learning System Acc w/ Adversary mean ± std. dev.
DNN-LMD Fig. 3(b) 0.63 0.03 37.8±4.6
DNN-LMD+ADV 0.55 0.06 36.5±5.4
CDNN-LMD Fig. 3(d) 0.63 0.21 9.62±5.8
CDNN-LMD+ADV 0.56 0.21 9.74±6.4
TABLE III
RESULTS OF APPLYING ADVERSARY TO MAKE SYSTEMS IN FIG. 3(B,D)
ALWAYS INCORRECT, AND AFTER TRAINING WITH ADVERSARY (ALG. 2).
adversaries insist on a higher minimum confidence: 34.5 dB
for a confidence of at least Rmin = 0.5, and 26.8 dB for a
confidence of at least Rmin = 0.9.
These results can be heard here: http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.
uk/∼sturm/research/DNN adversaries. We find that the pertur-
bations caused by these adversaries are certainly perceptible,
unlike those found for image data in [54] and [24]; however,
the distortion is very minor, and the music remains exactly the
same, e.g., pitches, rhythm, lyrics, instrumentation, dynamics,
and style all remain the same.
We now perform an experiment to compare (C)DNNs
trained with adversarial examples (as per Alg. 2) to the systems
in Fig. 3(b,d). To do this we test the response of these systems
against an adversary aimed at always eliciting an incorrect
response. (This is different from the adversary used above,
which seeks to make the system correct with probability
p = 0.1.) For this experiment, we set Rmin = 0.5 and SNR
to −300 dB in order to allow arbitrarily large perturbations to
force misclassifications. Table III illustrates the results of this
experiment from which we observe several interesting results.
Column 1 shows the normalized accuracy on the original test
set (with no adversary present). We see that training against
adversarial examples leads to a slight deflation in accuracy on
new test data. Column 2 shows the normalized accuracy of
these systems against our adversary intent on forcing a 100%
error rate. We see that the CDNN systems are more robust to
this adversary, and that the systems trained against adversarial
examples confer little to no advantage. Column 3 shows the
average perturbation size of the adversarial examples that
led to misclassifications. We notice that larger perturbations
(corresponding to lower SNRs) were required to get the
CDNN systems to misclassify test inputs. The minimum SNR
produced was 0.11 dB, while the maximum was 47.6 dB.
The results of this experiment point to the conclusions that
a) the CDNN systems are more robust to this adversary; and
b) training against adversarial examples (contrary to what we
hypothesized) does not seem reduce the misclassification rate
against new adversarial examples. A possible explanation for
the latter results is that, due to the high-dimensional nature
of the input space, the set of possible adversarial examples is
densely packed, so that training on a small number of these
points is not sufficient to allow the systems to generalize to
new adversarial examples.
V. DISCUSSION
Returning to the broadest question motivating our work, we
seek to measure the contribution of deep learning to music
content analysis. The previous sections describe a series of
experiments we have conducted using deep learning systems
of a variety of architectures, which we have trained and tested
in two different partitions of two benchmark music datasets We
have evaluated the robustness of these systems to an adversary
that has complete knowledge of the classifiers, and have also
investigated the use of an adversary in the training of deep
learning systems.
Our experimental results in Fig. 2 and Table I are essentially
reproductions of those reported in [44]. Based on the results
of their experiments with random partitionings of GTZAN,
Sigtia et al. [44] claim that their DNN-based systems learn
features that “better represent the audio” than standard or
10
(a) GTZAN fault-filtered (b) LMD artist-filtered
Fig. 6. As in Fig. 2, FoM for majority vote of minimum Mahalanobis distance classification of mean and variances over 5-second “texture” windows of
zero-crossings and the first 13 MFCCs computed from 46 ms windows hopped 50%.
“hand-crafted” features, e.g., those referenced in [30] like
MFCCs. Similar conclusions are made about the deep learning
systems in [28], also based on experiments using a random
partitioning of GTZAN. However, we see in Fig. 2 and Table
I that when we consider the faults in the GTZAN dataset and
partition it along artist lines, as for the LMD dataset in Fig. 3,
our deep learning systems perform significantly worse. This is
an expected outcome [23], [39], [49], but the artist information
in GTZAN was not available until 2012 [46].
This motivates the question of whether DNN-based systems
really do perform better than that of a classifier using standard,
low-level and “hand-crafted” features. To examine this, we
build baseline systems that use low-level features, and train
and test them in the same fault-filtered partition of GTZAN
as in Fig. 2(b), and the artist-filtered partition of LMD as in
Fig. 3(b,d). Mimicking [28], [44], we compute these features
based on a short-time analysis using 46ms frames hopped
by 50%. From each frame we extract the first 13 Mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) and zero-crossings,
and compute their mean and variance over five-second texture
windows (which are also hopped by 50%). We combine the
features of the training and validation sets of the fault-filtered
partition of GTZAN, and the artist filtered partition of LMD.
Both systems use a minimum Mahalanobis distance classifier,
and assign a class by majority vote from the classifications
of the individual texture windows. Figure 6 shows the FoM
produced by these baseline systems. We see that for GTZAN
it actually reproduces more ground truth than the DNN in Fig.
2(b) and all but one in Table I. Our simple baseline system
for LMD reproduces much less ground truth than the (C)DNN
in Fig. 3(b,d). Nonetheless, we have no reason to accept
the conclusion that deep learning features “perform better”
than “hand-crafted” features for the particular architectures
considered here and those in [28], [44]. Different experiments
are needed to address such a conclusion.
A tempting conclusion is that since the normalised classifi-
cation accuracies in Figs. 2(b) and 3(d) are extremely unlikely
to arise by chance (p < 10−62 for GTZAN and p < 10−290 for
LMD by a Binomial test) it is therefore entirely reasonable to
reject the hypothesis that our (C)DNN are choosing outputs at
random. Hence, one might argue that these (C)DNN must have
learned features that are “relevant” to music genre recognition
[28], [31], [44]. This argument appears throughout the MIR
research discipline [49], and turns on the strong assumption
that there are only two ways a system can reproduce the
ground truth of a dataset: by chance or by learning to solve
a specific problem thought to be well-posed by a cleanly
labeled dataset [51]. In fact, there is a third way a system can
reproduce the ground truth of a music dataset: by learning to
exploit characteristics shared between the training and testing
datasets that arise not from a relationship in the real world,
but from the curation and partitioning of a dataset in the
experimental design of an evaluation [48], [49], [53]. Since
the evaluations producing Figs. 2 and 3, as well as all results
in [28], [44], not to mention a significant number of published
studies in MIR [49], do not control for this third way, we
cannot validly conclude upon the “relevance” of whatever has
been learned by these music content analysis systems.
A notion of this problem is given by the significant de-
creases in the FoM we measure when partitioning GTZAN and
LMD along artist lines. By doing so, we are controlling for
some independent variables that a system might be exploiting
to reproduce ground truth, but which arguably have little
relevance to the high-level labels of the dataset [49]. More
concretely, consider that all 100 excerpts labeled Pop in
GTZAN come from recordings of music by four artists, 25
from each artist. If we train and test a system on a random
partition of GTZAN, we cannot know whether the system is
recognising Pop, recognising the artist, or recognising other
aspects that may or may not be related to Pop. If we train a
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system instead with Pop excerpts by three artists, test with the
Pop excerpts by the fourth artist, then we might be testing
something closer to Pop recognition. This all depends on
defining what knowledge is relevant to the problem.
A common retort to these arguments is that a system should
be able to reproduce ground truth “by any means.” One thereby
defines “relevant knowledge” as any correlations that helps a
system reproduce an amount of dataset ground truth that is
inconsistent with chance. However, this can lead to circular
reasoning: system X has learned “relevant knowledge” because
it reproduces Y amount of ground truth; system X reproduces
Y amount of ground truth because it has learned “relevant
knowledge.” It is also deaf to one of the major aims of research
in music content analysis [14]: “to make music, or information
about music, easier to find.” If a music content analysis system
is describing music in ways that do not align with those of
its users, then its usability is in jeopardy no matter its FoM
in benchmark datasets [42], [56]. Finally, this means that the
problem thought to be well-posed by a cleanly labeled dataset
can be many things simultaneously — which leads to the
problem of how to validly compare apples and oranges [51].
In other words, why compare systems when they are solving
different problems? This also applies to the comparisons above
with the FoM in Fig. 6.
While we have no idea whether our (C)DNN systems in
Fig. 3 are exploiting “irrelevant” characteristics in LMD, our
experimental results with adversaries in Figs. 4 and 5, and
Tables II and III, indicate that their decision machinery is
incredibly sensitive in very strange ways. Our adversaries are
able to fool the high-performing deep learning systems by
perturbing their input in minor ways. Auditioning the results
in Table II show that while the music in each recording
remains exactly the same, and the perturbations are very small,
the DNN is nearly always fooled into choosing with high
confidence every class it has supposedly learned. The CDNN
is similarly defeated by our adversary; however, it is quite
notable that it requires perturbations of far lower SNR than
does the DNN. We are currently studying the reasons for this.
Our application of adversaries here is close to the “method
of irrelevant transformations” that we apply in [48], [52],
[53] to assess the internal models of music content analysis
systems, and to test the hypothesis, “the system is using
relevant criteria to make its decisions.” In [48], we take a
brute force approach whereby we apply random but linear
time-invariant and minor filtering to inputs of systems trained
in three different music recording datasets until their FoM
becomes perfect or random. We also make each system apply
every one of its classes to the same music recordings in Table
II.4 In [53], we instead apply subtle pitch-preserving time-
stretching of music recordings to fool a deep learning system
trained in the benchmark music dataset BALLROOM [20].
We find that through such a transformation we can make the
system perform perfectly or no better than random by applying
tempo changes of at most 6% to test dataset recordings. We
find a similar result for the same kind of deep learning system
4These results can be auditioned here: http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/∼sturm/
research/TM expt2/index.html
but trained in LMD [52].
Our adversary in Alg. 1 moves instead right to the achilles
heel of a deep learning system, coaxing it to behave in arbitrary
ways for an input simply by making minor perturbations to
the sampled audio waveform that have no effect on the music
content it possesses. We observe in Fig. 5 and auditioning
Table II that the low- to mid-frequency content of adversarial
examples differs very little from the original recordings, but
find more significant differences in the high-frequency spectra.
This suggests that the distribution of energy in the high-
frequency spectrum has significant impact on the decision
machinery of our (C)DNN. The apparent high relevance of
such slight characteristics in proportion to that of the actual
musical content of a music recording does not bode well
for one of the most important aims of machine learning:
generalisation.
As observed by Goodfellow et al. [24] in their deep learning
systems taught to recognise objects in images, the impressive
FoM we measure of our deep learning systems may be merely
a colourful “Potemkin village.” Employing an adversary to
scratch a little below the surface reveals the FoM to be
curiously hollow. A system that appears to be solving a
complex problem but actually is not is what we term a “horse”
[48], which is a nod to the famous horse Clever Hans: a real
horse that appeared to be a capable mathematician but was
merely responding to involuntary cues that went undetected
because his public demonstrations had no validity to attest to
such an ability. Measuring the number of correct answers Hans
gives in an uncontrolled environment does not give reason
to conclude he comprehends what he appears to be doing.
It is the same with the experiments we perform above with
systems labelling observations in GTZAN and LMD. In fact,
Goodfellow et al. [24] come to the same conclusion: “The
existence of adversarial examples suggests that ... being able
to correctly label the test data does not imply that our models
truly understand the tasks we have asked them to perform”
[24]. This observation is now well-known in MIR [47]–[50],
but deserves to be repeated.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have shown how to adapt the adversary
of Szegedy et al. [54] to work within the context of music
content analysis using deep learning. We have shown how our
adversary is effective at fooling deep learning systems of dif-
ferent architectures, trained on different benchmark datasets.
We find our convolutional networks are more robust against
this adversary than our deep neural networks. We have also
sought to employ the adversary as part of the training of these
systems, but find it results in systems that remain as sensitive
to the same adversary.
It is of course not very popular for one to be an “adversary”
to research, moving quickly to refute conclusions and break
systems reported in the literature; however, we insist that
breaking systems leads ultimately to progress. Considerable
insight can be gained by looking behind the veil of perfor-
mance metrics in an attempt to determine the mechanisms
by which a system operates, and whether the evaluation is
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any valid reflection of the qualities we wish to measure. Such
probing is necessary if we are truly interested in ascertaining
what a system has learned to do, what its vulnerabilities might
be, how it compares to competing systems supposedly solving
the same problem, and how well we can expect it to perform
when used in real-world applications.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CK and JL were supported in part by the Danish Council
for Strategic Research of the Danish Agency for Science
Technology and Innovation under the CoSound project, case
number 11-115328. This publication only reflects the authors’
views.
REFERENCES
[1] J. B. Allen and L. Rabiner. A unified approach to short-time Fourier
analysis and synthesis. Proc. IEEE, 65(11):1558–1564, Nov. 1977.
[2] J.-J. Aucouturier and F. Pachet. Scaling up music playlist generation.
In Multimedia and Expo, 2002. ICME ’02. Proceedings. 2002 IEEE
International Conference on, volume 1, pages 105–108 vol.1, 2002.
[3] J-.J. Aucouturier and F. Pachet. Improving timbre similarity: How high
is the sky? J. of Negative Results in Speech and Audio Sciences, 1(1),
2004.
[4] Fre´de´ric Bastien, Pascal Lamblin, Razvan Pascanu, James Bergstra,
Ian J. Goodfellow, Arnaud Bergeron, Nicolas Bouchard, and Yoshua
Bengio. Theano: new features and speed improvements. Deep Learning
and Unsupervised Feature Learning NIPS 2012 Workshop, 2012.
[5] E. Battenberg and D. Wessel. Analyzing drum patterns using conditional
deep belief networks. In Proc. ISMIR, 2012.
[6] Y. Bengio, I. Goodfellow, and A. Courville. Deep Learning. MIT Press,
2015 (in preparation).
[7] Yoshua Bengio. Learning deep architectures for AI. Foundations and
trends in Machine Learning, 2(1):1–127, 2009.
[8] James Bergstra, Olivier Breuleux, Fre´de´ric Bastien, Pascal Lamblin,
Razvan Pascanu, Guillaume Desjardins, Joseph Turian, David Warde-
Farley, and Yoshua Bengio. Theano: a CPU and GPU math expression
compiler. In Proceedings of the Python for Scientific Computing
Conference (SciPy), June 2010. Oral Presentation.
[9] T. Bertin-Mahieux, D. Eck, and M. Mandel. Automatic tagging of audio:
The state-of-the-art. In W. Wang, editor, Machine Audition: Principles,
Algorithms and Systems. IGI Publishing, 2010.
[10] T. Bertin-Mahieux, D. P.W. Ellis, B. Whitman, and P. Lamere. The
million song dataset. In Proc. ISMIR, 2011.
[11] N. Boulanger-Lewandowski, Y. Bengio, and P. Vincent. Audio chord
recognition with recurrent neural networks. In Proc. ISMIR, 2013.
[12] C. J. C. Burges, J. C. Platt, and S. Jana. Distortion discriminant analysis
for audio fingerprinting. IEEE Trans. Speech Audio Process., 11(3):165–
174, May 2003.
[13] M. Casey, C. Rhodes, and M. Slaney. Analysis of minimum distances
in high-dimensional musical spaces. IEEE Trans. Audio, Speech, Lang.
Process., 16(5):1015–1028, July 2008.
[14] M. Casey, R. Veltkamp, M. Goto, M. Leman, C. Rhodes, and M. Slaney.
Content-based music information retrieval: Current directions and future
challenges. Proc. IEEE, 96(4):668–696, Apr. 2008.
[15] Nick Collins. Computational analysis of musical influence: A musico-
logical case study using mir tools. In ISMIR, pages 177–182, 2010.
[16] N. Dalvi, P. Domingos, Mausam, S. Sanghai, and D. Verma. Adversarial
classification. KDD, 2004.
[17] L. Deng and D. Yu. Deep Learning: Methods and Applications. Now
Publishers, 2014.
[18] S. Dieleman, P. Brakel, and B. Schrauwen. Audio-based music classifi-
cation with a pretrained convolutional network. In Proc. ISMIR, 2011.
[19] S. Dieleman and B. Schrauwen. End-to-end learning for music audio.
In Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2014 IEEE
International Conference on, pages 6964–6968, May 2014.
[20] S. Dixon, F. Gouyon, and G. Widmer. Towards characterisation of music
via rhythmic patterns. In Proc. ISMIR, pages 509–517, 2004.
[21] S. Ewert, B. Pardo, M. Muller, and M.D. Plumbley. Score-informed
source separation for musical audio recordings: An overview. Signal
Processing Magazine, IEEE, 31(3):116–124, May 2014.
[22] A. Flexer. A closer look on artist filters for musical genre classification.
In Proc. ISMIR, pages 341–344, Sep. 2007.
[23] A. Flexer, D. Schnitzer, M. Gasser, and T. Pohle. Combining features
reduces hubness in audio similarity. In Proc. Int. Symp. Music Info.
Retrieval, 2010.
[24] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples. In Proc. ICLR, 2015.
[25] Daniel Griffin and Jae S Lim. Signal estimation from modified short-
time fourier transform. Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, IEEE
Transactions on, 32(2):236–243, 1984.
[26] Niall Griffith and Peter M Todd. Musical networks: Parallel distributed
perception and performance. MIT Press, 1999.
[27] S. Gu and L. Rigazio. Towards Deep Neural Network Architectures
Robust to Adversarial Examples. ArXiv e-prints, December 2014.
[28] P. Hamel and D. Eck. Learning features from music audio with deep
belief networks. In Proc. ISMIR, 2010.
[29] T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman. The Elements of Statistical
Learning: Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction. Springer-Verlag, 2
edition, 2009.
[30] M. Henaff, K. Jarrett, K. Kavukcuoglu, and Y. LeCun. Unsupervised
learning of sparse features for scalable audio classification. In Proc. Int.
Soc. Music Info. Retrieval, Miami, FL, Oct. 2011.
[31] E. J. Humphrey, J. P. Bello, and Y. LeCun. Feature learning and deep
architectures: New directions for music informatics. J. Intell. Info.
Systems, 41(3):461–481, 2013.
[32] E.J. Humphrey and J.P. Bello. From music audio to chord tablature:
Teaching deep convolutional networks toplay guitar. In Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2014 IEEE International
Conference on, pages 6974–6978, May 2014.
[33] C. Kereliuk, B. L. Sturm, and J. Larsen. Deep learning, audio adver-
saries, and music content analysis. In Proc. WASPAA, 2015.
[34] H. Lee, Y. Largman, P. Pham, and A. Y. Ng. Unsupervised feature learn-
ing for audio classification using convolutional deep belief networks. In
Proc. Neural Info. Process. Systems, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, Dec.
2009.
[35] T. LH. Li, A. B. Chan, and A. HW. Chun. Automatic musical pattern
feature extraction using convolutional neural network. In Proc. Int. Conf.
Data Mining and Applications, 2010.
[36] B. Matityaho and M. Furst. Neural network based model for classifica-
tion of music type. In Proc. Conv. Electrical and Elect. Eng. in Israel,
pages 1–5, Mar. 1995.
[37] G. Montavon, G. B. Orr, and K.-R. Mu¨ller, editors. Neural Networks,
Tricks of the Trade, Reloaded. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS 7700). Springer, 2012.
[38] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune. Deep neural networks are easily
fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images. In Proc.
NIPS, 2014.
[39] E. Pampalk, A. Flexer, and G. Widmer. Improvements of audio-based
music similarity and genre classification. In Proc. Int. Soc. Music Info.
Retrieval, pages 628–233, Sep. 2005.
[40] G. Papadopoulos and G. Wiggins. Ai methods for algorithmic compo-
sition: A survey, a critical view and future prospects. In Proc. AISB
Symposim on Musical Creativity, pages 110–117, 1999.
[41] A. Pikrakis. A deep learning approach to rhythm modeling with
applications. In Proc. Int. Workshop Machine Learning and Music, 2013.
[42] M. Schedl, A. Flexer, and J. Urbano. The neglected user in music
information retrieval research. J. Intell. Info. Systems, 41(3):523–539,
2013.
[43] D. Schwarz. Concatenative sound synthesis: The early years. J. New
Music Research, 35(1):3–22, Mar. 2006.
[44] S. Sigtia and S. Dixon. Improved music feature learning with deep
neural networks. In Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
2014 IEEE International Conference on, pages 6959–6963, May 2014.
[45] C. N. Silla, A. L. Koerich, and C. A. A. Kaestner. The Latin music
database. In Proc. ISMIR, 2008.
[46] B. L. Sturm. An analysis of the GTZAN music genre dataset. In Proc.
ACM MIRUM Workshop, pages 7–12, Nara, Japan, Nov. 2012.
[47] B. L. Sturm. Classification accuracy is not enough: On the evaluation of
music genre recognition systems. J. Intell. Info. Systems, 41(3):371–406,
2013.
[48] B. L. Sturm. A simple method to determine if a music information
retrieval system is a “horse”. IEEE Trans. Multimedia, 16(6):1636–
1644, 2014.
[49] B. L. Sturm. The state of the art ten years after a state of the art:
Future research in music information retrieval. J. New Music Research,
43(2):147–172, 2014.
13
[50] B. L. Sturm. A survey of evaluation in music genre recognition.
In A. Nu¨rnberger, S. Stober, B. Larsen, and M. Detyniecki, editors,
Adaptive Multimedia Retrieval: Semantics, Context, and Adaptation,
volume LNCS 8382, pages 29–66, Oct. 2014.
[51] B. L. Sturm. “horse” inside: Seeking causes of the behaviours of
music content analysis systems. ACM Computers in Entertainment, 2015
(submitted).
[52] B. L. Sturm, C. Kereliuk, and J. Larsen. ¿ el caballo viejo? latin genre
recognition with deep learning and spectral periodicity. In Proc. Int.
Conf. on Mathematics and Computation in Music, 2015.
[53] B. L. Sturm, C. Kereliuk, and A. Pikrakis. A closer look at deep learning
neural networks with low-level spectral periodicity features. In Proc. Int.
Workshop on Cognitive Info. Process., 2014.
[54] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow,
and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In Proc. ICLR,
2014.
[55] G. Tzanetakis and P. Cook. Musical genre classification of audio signals.
IEEE Trans. Speech Audio Process., 10(5):293–302, July 2002.
[56] J. Urbano, M. Schedl, and X. Serra. Evaluation in music information
retrieval. J. Intell. Info. Systems, 41(3):345–369, Dec. 2013.
[57] A. van den Oord, S. Dieleman, and B. Schrauwen. Deep content-based
music recommendation. In Proc. NIPS, 2013.
[58] N. Vempala and F. Russo. Predicting emotion from music audio features
using neural networks. In Proc. CMMR, 2012.
[59] A. Wang. An industrial strength audio search algorithm. In Proc. Int.
Soc. Music Info. Retrieval, Oct. 2003.
[60] F. Weninger, F. Eyben, and B. Schuller. On-line continuous-time music
mood regression with deep recurrent neural networks. In Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2014 IEEE International
Conference on, pages 5412–5416, May 2014.
[61] B. Whitman, G. Flake, and S. Lawrence. Artist detection in music with
minnowmatch. Proc. IEEE Workshop on Neural Networks for Signal
Processing, pages 559–568, 2001.
[62] G. A. Wiggins. Semantic gap?? Schemantic schmap!! Methodological
considerations in the scientific study of music. In Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
Mulitmedia, pages 477–482, Dec. 2009.
[63] X. Yang, Q. Chen, S. Zhou, and X. Wang. Deep belief networks for
automatic music genre classification. In Proc. INTERSPEECH, pages
2433–2436, 2011.
[64] Y.-H. Yang and H. H. Chen. Music Emotion Recognition. CRC Press,
2011.
[65] Chiyuan Zhang, G. Evangelopoulos, S. Voinea, L. Rosasco, and T. Pog-
gio. A deep representation for invariance and music classification.
In Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2014 IEEE
International Conference on, pages 6984–6988, May 2014.
